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ANALYZING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S HOLDING IN HERRERA v. WYOMING
Andrew Rader*
Introduction
The Crow Tribe has inhabited southern Montana and northern Wyoming
for more than three centuries; 1 Wyoming officially became a state in 1890,
long after the Crow Tribe settled in the area. 2 The Tribe’s settlement
encompassed what is now known as the Bighorn National Forest, which is
partly located in present-day Wyoming. 3 Various territories officially
declared statehood, and a recurring question became whether tribal treaty
rights relating to the lands—now a part of the state—were preempted by the
declaration of statehood.4 A common analysis in any treaty-rights case
involves looking to congressional intent, as the legislature has the right to
abrogate treaty rights in toto. 5 Statehood preemption questions have arisen
frequently in usufructuary rights cases—ones involving hunting and fishing
rights.6 But that is not to say that the Supreme Court’s analysis in
usufructuary rights cases cannot be applied to other, more significant treaty
rights. Due in part to recent developments in case law and turnover on the
Supreme Court, tribal treaty rights—not simply usufructuary ones—are
currently the safest they have ever been.
This Note will examine the line of cases involving statehood preemption
of tribal treaty rights leading up to the recently decided Supreme Court case
of Herrera v. Wyoming.7 Part I will lay out the background and history of
cases grappling with statehood preemption, the doctrine’s treatment by the
Supreme Court and other courts, and recent turnover on the Court in favor
of the tribes. Part II will examine the recent case of Herrera v. Wyoming
and the Supreme Court’s shift in favor of the tribes with its holding in that
case.8 Part III will discuss counterarguments in support of statehood
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
2. Act of July 10, 1890 (Wyoming Statehood Act), ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222.
3. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1692–93 (2019).
4. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 207 (1999).
5. Id.; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896) (“That ‘a treaty may supersede a
prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress supersede a prior treaty,’ is elementary.”).
6. See, e.g., Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686; Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172.
7. 139 S. Ct. 1686.
8. Id.
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preemption and the implications moving forward post-Herrera. Finally,
Part IV will conclude this Note and extrapolate on the broad reach of
Herrera in other contexts based on the present makeup of the Supreme
Court.
I. History of Statehood Preemption and Recent
Supreme Court Developments
Statehood preemption has not been an issue in recent times because no
territory has become a state since Hawaii joined the Union in August of
1959.9 The issue still arises, however, when debating centuries-old tribal
treaty rights. 10 Throughout more than a century of jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has essentially done an about-face with its view on the
doctrine. 11 Differing views among the justices has led to many deep divides,
at times along ideological lines. Overall, the case law has been developing
for over a century.
A. Ward v. Race Horse and the Early Supreme Court View
The Supreme Court addressed a statehood preemption argument in the
early case of Ward v. Race Horse in 1896.12 The facts before the Court in
Race Horse were strikingly similar to those found in Herrera.13 Race Horse
involved the Bannock Tribe of Indians, another tribe with land in presentday Wyoming, and the Tribe’s treaty with the United States.14 Within this
treaty, article 4 provided, in part, the following language: “[B]ut they shall
have the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long
as game may be found thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the
whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts.”15 The crux of
this case was whether Wyoming’s statehood preempted the Bannock
Tribe’s treaty right to hunt on the “unoccupied lands of the United States,”
which included the Bighorn National Forest. 16 Race Horse, a member of the
Bannock Tribe, was arrested for violating a state gaming law after killing
seven elk in Wyoming; he argued that he was entitled to hunt,
9. See Proclamation No. 3309, 24 Fed. Reg. 6868 (1959).
10. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172.
11. Compare Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), with Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686.
12. 163 U.S. 504.
13. See infra text accompanying note numbers 81–93.
14. See Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshoni and Bannock (Shoshone-Bannock
Treaty), July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673.
15. Id. art. 4, quoted in Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 507.
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notwithstanding the law, as a member of the Tribe and in light of the clear
treaty language. 17 The State of Wyoming countered that its admittance as a
state to the Union abrogated the Shoshone-Bannock Treaty’s provision to
hunt freely on said lands. 18 The Supreme Court thus had to analyze whether
the treaty remained valid.
In stark contrast to the eventual outcome in Herrera in 2019, the Court in
Race Horse concluded that the Shoshone-Bannock Treaty right to hunt was
extinguished when Wyoming officially became a state. 19 Justice White,
writing for the majority, first reasoned that states are admitted to the Union
on an “equal footing” with existing states.20 The equal-footing doctrine
dictates that “all States enter the Union with the full panoply of powers
enjoyed by the original 13 States at the adoption of the Constitution.”21 The
State therefore could not be burdened by treaties that conflicted with
Wyoming’s “vested” power “to regulate the killing of game within [its]
borders.”22 Moreover, the majority deemed the treaty’s hunting rights
provision “essentially perishable and intended to be of limited duration.” 23
The Court criticized the defendant’s argument that the terms of the treaty
were “perpetual,” and instead opted to assume the right was “temporary and
precarious.”24 The Court interpreted the Tribe’s argument as “distorting the
words of [the] treaty” and ignoring “the express will of Congress” since the
treaty would be in direct conflict with Wyoming’s ability to govern itself.25
The dissent, on the other hand, penned by Justice Henry Brown, came to
the opposite conclusion, reasoning that “abrogation of a public treaty ought
not to be inferred from doubtful language, but that the intention of congress
to repudiate its obligation ought clearly to appear.”26 Justice Brown took a
practical approach to interpreting the treaty. He stated that Congress surely
anticipated Wyoming would become a state, but instead of reserving the
Bannock Tribe’s right to hunt until statehood, Congress instead reserved the
hunting rights “so long as game may be found upon the lands, and so long
17. In re Race Horse, 70 F. 598, 599–600 (Cir. Ct. D. Wyo. 1895), rev’d sub nom. Ward
v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
18. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514.
19. Id. at 516.
20. Id. at 509–14 (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845)).
21. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1705 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).
22. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 509–14 (citing Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 212 (1845)).
23. Id. at 515.
24. Id. at 510.
25. Id. at 516.
26. Id. at 517 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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as peace should subsist on the borders of the hunting districts.”27 In his final
remarks, Justice Brown expressed his uneasiness toward the majority’s
holding that the mere admission of a state to the union can constructively
occupy land which is, in fact, unoccupied, for the purposes of tribal treaty
rights.28
In the case of Herrera v. Wyoming, the State of Wyoming relied heavily
on the case of Race Horse, presumably because the facts before the Herrera
Court were, for all intents and purposes, exactly the same as the facts in
Race Horse.29 Additionally, the State of Wyoming pointed to the holding
and reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis in
Herrera.30
B. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis and the Tenth Circuit’s Continuation of
Race Horse
The Tenth Circuit reinforced the power of statehood preemption in the
1990s in the case of Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.31 The Repsis decision
would become a deeply disputed case between the majority and the dissent
in Herrera.32 In Repsis, Thomas L. Ten Bear was issued a citation by game
warden Chuck Repsis for killing elk in the Bighorn National Forest without
a valid hunting license.33 Following a successful prosecution and
conviction, Ten Bear challenged the ruling, citing the exact treaty at issue in
Herrera.34 In representing Ten Bear, the Crow Tribe sought both
declaratory relief and an injunction against the State of Wyoming for
violating the 1868 Treaty.35 Before arriving at the Tenth Circuit, the case
was heard by the Wyoming federal district court, which dismissed the
action, citing Race Horse as binding authority that the Crow Tribe’s
hunting right had been abrogated.36 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s dismissal, reasoning that the Crow Tribe’s argument was

27. Id. at 518 (Brown, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 520 (Brown, J., dissenting).
29. Compare discussion of Race Horse supra text accompanying notes 12–18 with
discussion of Herrera infra text accompanying notes 83–91.
30. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis II), 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995).
31. Id.
32. See infra Sections II.C–D.
33. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 985.
34. Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, art. IV, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
35. Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 986.
36. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis I), 866 F. Supp. 520, 522–25 (D. Wyo.
1994).
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too similar to the one espoused by the Bannock Tribe in Race Horse;37 the
hunting right was preempted by statehood. 38 To conclude, the Tenth Circuit,
while admonishing the lower court’s reluctance to follow Race Horse,
found Justice White’s majority opinion “compelling, well-reasoned, and
persuasive.”39 “Race Horse is alive and well,” the Court professed.40
Senior Circuit Judge Barrett’s opinion includes a thorough examination
of the holding and reasoning in Race Horse to elaborate on the decision’s
alleged persuasiveness. 41 Immediately following is a review of subsequent
cases relied on by the Crow Tribe; the Tribe argued that the holding in Race
Horse had been essentially overruled by “a string of cases upholding
federal authority to regulate wildlife notwithstanding claims of interference
with state sovereignty.”42 The Court expressly rejected this argument,
finding that “absent any conflict between federal and state authority to
regulate the taking of game, the state retains the authority, even over federal
lands within its borders.”43 The fact that the Repsis Court based its
reasoning on two separate, independent theories—statehood preemption
and conservation rights—led to a bitter disagreement between the majority
and dissent in Herrera v. Wyoming.44
In a final effort to convince the Tenth Circuit of its right under the treaty,
the Crow Tribe contended that newly reformed canons of construction postRace Horse should persuade the court to construe the treaty language in its
favor.45 The Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed this argument, citing
Worcester v. Georgia,46 and pointing out that these canons of construction
were well-known by the Court in Race Horse.47
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Repsis solidified the idea that Race
Horse was still relevant when interpreting tribal treaty language. But four
years later, the Supreme Court delivered a decision with strong implications
that Race Horse was not the controlling law that it once was.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 988.
Id. at 992 (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514 (1896)).
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id. at 988–89.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 990 (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976)).
See infra Sections II.C–D.
Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 992.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
Repsis II, 73 F.3d at 992.
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C. The Court’s About-Face on Statehood Preemption in Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians
The Supreme Court sought to end the reign of the Race Horse decision
when it decided Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians48 in
1999. Another treaty dispute, the Mille Lacs decision involved the granting
of hunting rights, among other things, to the Chippewa Indians in exchange
for their lands in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota.49 After Minnesota
was established as the thirty-second state in the Union,50 the Chippewa
Tribe sought a declaration from the courts that its usufructuary rights in the
area were retained.51 In a harsh rebuke of the Race Horse decision, both the
district court and the Eighth Circuit held that the Chippewa Tribe’s hunting
rights under the treaty were not abrogated by Minnesota’s statehood.52 The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. In a 5-4 opinion authored
by Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court held in favor of the Tribe; a
stunning reversal, at least on its face, to years of precedent to the contrary. 53
While on the surface this decision looks like an explicit overturning of
Race Horse, the Court tried instead to distinguish its decision. 54
Specifically, Justice O’Connor reasoned that Minnesota’s statehood by
itself did not abrogate the Tribe’s treaty right.55 If the treaty right were to
ever be abrogated, the Court held, Congress would need to express a clear
intent to do so. 56 Using this methodology, the Chippewa Tribe’s treaty
rights were retained absent any clear intent of Congress to abrogate them. 57
The State of Minnesota relied on the holding in Race Horse.58 The Court
responded to that argument in a straightforward manner: “Race Horse
rested on a false premise.”59 Citing to a few subsequent cases, the Court
found that tribal hunting rights “are not irreconcilable with a State’s

48. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
49. Id. at 175–76.
50. Act of May 11, 1858, ch. 31, 11 Stat. 285.
51. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 185.
52. Id. at 187.
53. Id. at 176.
54. Id. at 203–08. This attempt to distinguish would ultimately lead to the battle over
issue preclusion between the majority and dissent in Herrera.
55. Id. at 202–03.
56. Id. at 202 (citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738–40 (1986)).
57. Id. at 203.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 204.
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sovereignty over the natural resources in the State.”60 In other words, both
rights can coexist.61 The Court pointed out, however, that the Crow Tribe’s
usufructuary rights in Race Horse conflicted with Wyoming’s regulation of
natural resources, and therefore were an “impairment of Wyoming’s
sovereignty.”62 As applied to the Chippewa Tribe, the usufructuary rights
were retained because Minnesota’s statehood did not affect them, and
Congress had not expressed a clear intent to abrogate them. 63
Chief Justice William Rehnquist—joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas—delivered a scathing dissenting opinion in Mille Lacs.64 Amid
other disagreements with the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist expressed
his “strong disagreement” with the Court’s holding that Minnesota’s
admission to the Union did not abrogate the Chippewa Tribe’s hunting
rights.65 Rehnquist dubbed the Court’s treatment of Race Horse
“jurisprudential legerdemain,” or sleight of hand, because it seemed to
overrule the decision while claiming to be distinguishable. 66 The dissent
was especially confused by the fact that the treaty language in the
Chippewa treaty was even more “temporary and precarious” than the
language in the Crow treaty at issue in Race Horse.67 In the end, the
dissenters believed the equal-footing doctrine recognized by the Race
Horse Court should have carried the day, but it was instead set aside by the
majority. 68
D. Turnover on the Supreme Court in Favor of the Tribes
Following a close 5-4 decision in Mille Lacs, justices on the bench
favoring tribal treaty rights were only a simple majority. Of the five justices
that made up the majority in Mille Lacs, only two remain on the Court
today—Justices Ginsburg and Breyer; and of the dissenters, only Justice

60. Id. (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 208.
64. Id. at 208–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent
but joined Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion as well.
65. Id. at 217 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 219–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S.
504, 515 (1896)). The qualifying language in the Chippewa treaty guaranteed hunting rights
“during the pleasure of the President.”
68. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Thomas remains.69 Apart from Justice O’Connor, who was considered part
of the conservative wing during her tenure on the bench, 70 the 5-4 split in
Mille Lacs was along ideological lines. The swing vote of Justice O’Connor
in favor of the Tribes was presumably unexpected since she was much more
likely to vote with the conservative bloc than the liberal bloc of justices
throughout her time on the Court.71 The next time the tribal treaty issue
would be construed in the same context, the makeup of the Court would be
drastically different.
Since President Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he has had the
opportunity to appoint two justices to the Supreme Court—Justices Neil
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. Because they were appointed by a
Republican president, both junior justices on the Court are considered more
conservative than liberal so far in their tenure. But their minimal time on
the Court begs the question of how both Gorsuch and Kavanaugh will vote
in tribal cases. Because the makeup of the Court is entirely different from
when Mille Lacs was decided, mere inferences could only be made about
the voting habits of the bench in tribal treaty cases in 2019.
Prior to Herrera v. Wyoming, the March 2019 decision of Washington
State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.72 shed some light on the
new justices’ inclinations in tribal treaty cases. Cougar Den involved a
dispute over a Washington state gasoline transportation tax enforced against
the Yakama Tribe.73 The actual text of the treaty gave members of the
Yakama Tribe “the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to
travel upon all public highways.”74 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Gorsuch sided
with the liberal wing of justices, authoring a concurring opinion joined by
Justice Ginsburg; Justice Kavanaugh joined the conservative wing and
authored his own dissenting opinion. 75 Justice Gorsuch explained that the
69. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
biographies.aspx (last visited Sep. 29, 2019).
70. See J AN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT : THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 68 (2007) (noting that
O’Connor voted with Chief Justice Rehnquist, an outspoken conservative, in 87% of his
opinions during her first three years on the Court).
71. See Robert J. Jackson & Thiruvendran Vignarajah, Nine Justices, Ten Years: A
Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 512 (2004).
72. 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).
73. Id. at 1006–07.
74. Treaty with the Yakama Nation, art. 3, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, quoted in Cougar
Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1007.
75. Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1016–21 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1026–29
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The majority included Associate Justices Gorsuch, Ginsburg,
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Court’s objective was to interpret the language in a way “most consistent
with the treaty’s original meaning.”76 In light of that objective, Gorsuch
reasoned that the “factual findings . . . require[d] a ruling for the
Yakamas.”77 Justice Kavanaugh, on the other hand, sided with the State’s
view that the treaty language was best interpreted to give the Yakama Tribe
the right to travel on “public highways on equal terms with other U.S.
citizens.”78
Cougar Den was a treaty interpretation case much like the past-discussed
cases of Race Horse, Mille Lacs, and Repsis. The resulting votes in Cougar
Den painted a picture of how the current Supreme Court would approach
these cases. Moving forward, the result in Cougar Den called into question
the outcome of the later decision of Herrera v. Wyoming, which this Note
will now examine.
II. The Supreme Court’s Affirmance of Mille Lacs in Herrera v. Wyoming
The century-and-a-half development of statehood preemption and its
place in the Supreme Court’s view would come to the forefront in 2019 in
the case of Herrera v. Wyoming.79 After Justice Gorsuch sided with the
liberal wing on the Native American rights issue in Cougar Den, the Crow
Tribe was hopeful that his support would continue into the usufructuary
rights arena.80
A. Facts of the Case
The Crow Tribe was originally nomadic, inhabiting parts of Canada
before making their way south to what is now southern Montana and
northern Wyoming. 81 As such, the Tribe has always hunted game for
subsistence. 82 Due to the increase in American settlers migrating west for
new lands, the lands occupied by the Crow Tribe became the property of
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer; the dissent included Associate Justices Alito, Thomas, and
Kavanaugh, as well as Chief Justice Roberts.
76. Id. at 1016 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 1017 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 1026 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
79. 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).
80. See Nick Martin, Gorsuch Sides with Liberal Justices to Spoil Washington’s Attempt
to Rewrite Tribal Law, SPLINTER (Mar. 20, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://splinternews.com/
gorsuch-sides-with-liberal-justices-to-spoil-washington-1833433274.
81. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1981).
82. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1692 (citing JOSEPH M. CROW, FROM THE HEART OF THE
CROW COUNTRY: THE CROW INDIANS’ OWN STORIES 4–5, 8 (1992)).
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the United States after a series of treaties. The First Treaty of Fort Laramie
of 1851 (1851 Treaty) was between the Tribe and the United States and
designated around thirty-eight million acres as Crow territory. 83 The 1851
Treaty clarified that the Tribe “did not ‘surrender the privilege of hunting,
fishing, or passing over’ any of the lands [at issue].”84 The Second Treaty of
Fort Laramie of 1868 (1868 Treaty) reduced the Crow reservation to around
eight million acres and included a piece of the Big Horn River. 85 Many
more acts of Congress reduced the Tribe’s acreage further to around 2.3
million acres,86 but, at issue in Herrera was the 1868 Treaty.87
The treaty language in question in Herrera was almost verbatim the
language in the treaty in Race Horse but with a different tribe. Article 4 of
the 1868 Treaty provided that “[t]he Indians . . . shall have the right to hunt
on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found
thereon, and as long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the
borders of the hunting districts.”88 A few months after the 1868 Treaty was
signed, Wyoming became a territory and twenty-two years later was
admitted to the Union as the forty-fourth state.89 Additionally, in 1897,
President Grover Cleveland “reserved from entry or settlement” lands in
Wyoming ceded by the Crow Tribe that became known as the Bighorn
National Forest.90
Clayvin Herrera is a member of the Crow Tribe and, in 2014, he pursued
a herd of elk across the boundary of the Crow reservation into the Bighorn
National Forest.91 Herrera and fellow tribal members successfully killed a
few elk and returned to the reservation with the meat. 92 Subsequently,

83. Montana, 450 U.S. at 547–48 (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., art. 5,
Sept. 17, 1851, 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 594 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904)).
84. Id. at 548 (quoting Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, Etc., supra note 83, art. 5).
85. Id. (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, supra note 34, art. 2).
86. Id. (citing Act of Apr. 11, 1882, ch. 74, 22 Stat. 42; Act of Mar. 5, 1891, § 31, ch.
543, 26 Stat. 989, 1039–40; Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352; Act of Aug. 31,
1937, ch. 890, 50 Stat. 884).
87. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1691 (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians,
supra note 34).
88. Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, supra note 34, art. 4, quoted in
Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693.
89. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693 (citing Act of July 10, 1890 (Wyoming Statehood Act),
ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222).
90. Presidential Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909 (1897), quoted in Herrera, 139 S. Ct.
at 1693.
91. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1693.
92. Id.
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Herrera was arrested by Wyoming authorities for hunting elk out of season
and, thus, violating state law. 93
B. Procedural Posture
At the state trial court level, Herrera filed a motion to dismiss the case,
citing the clear language in the 1868 Treaty that gave him the right to hunt
within the boundaries of the Bighorn National Forest.94 The court denied
the motion to dismiss and allowed the case to go to trial. 95 Herrera’s
defensive use of the treaty language was not permitted, and a jury convicted
him of hunting elk out of season. 96
Herrera then appealed to the state appellate court, whose question on
appeal was “whether the Crow Tribe’s off-reservation hunting right was
still valid.”97 Herrera argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians had implicitly
overruled the previous holding in Ward v. Race Horse, and, therefore,
undermined the reasoning in the Tenth Circuit’s Crow Tribe of Indians v.
Repsis decision.98 The state appellate court instead decided that the Repsis
decision was not undermined because Mille Lacs had not overruled Race
Horse.99 Therefore, according to the court, the treaty right under the 1868
Treaty “expired upon Wyoming’s statehood.”100 As an alternative ground
for dismissing Herrera’s claim, the appellate court also held that issue
preclusion was merited based on the judgment in Repsis because Herrera is
a member of the Crow Tribe, which litigated the Repsis case “on behalf of
itself and its members.”101 Lastly, the court, again relying on Repsis,
concluded that the land on which Herrera was hunting was “occupied”
within the meaning of the treaty language when the Bighorn National
Forest was established. 102
After the Wyoming Supreme Court denied Herrera’s petition for review
of the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.103
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1693–94.
99. Id. at 1694.
100. Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App-31 to App-34, Herrera, 139 S. Ct.
1686 (No. 2016-242)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id.
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C. Justice Sotomayor’s Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision in favor of the Crow Tribe, Justice Sonia Sotomayor
delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan,
and Gorsuch. 104 The opinion addressed two main issues: (1) whether the
Crow Tribe’s hunting rights under the 1868 Treaty remained valid; and (2)
even if the treaty right was valid, whether the protection extends into the
Bighorn National Forest if it was “occupied.”105 The majority also briefly
addressed the problem of issue preclusion, which is discussed below in
Section II.D.
On the first point, the majority in Herrera concluded that the Crow
Tribe’s hunting rights under the treaty remained valid, even after Wyoming
became a state.106 This conclusion was predominantly based on the Court’s
holding twenty years prior in Mille Lacs, which effectively overruled Race
Horse, even though it had not done so explicitly. 107 In so holding, the
majority rejected the “equal footing” doctrine relied on in Race Horse,
much like the Mille Lacs Court had done. 108 Instead of adopting the “equal
footing” doctrine, the majority in Herrera, again much like the Mille Lacs
Court, decided that in order for a tribal treaty right to be deemed abrogated,
Congress “must clearly express” an intent to do so.109 In other words, the
question is “whether Congress has expressly abrogated an Indian treaty
right or whether a termination point identified in the treaty itself has been
satisfied.”110
Applying that analysis to the Crow Tribe’s 1868 Treaty, the majority
found that Wyoming’s declaration of statehood, without more, did not
abrogate the tribal treaty right. 111 According to Justice Sotomayor, this part
of the analysis was simple because Congress never expressed an intent to
abrogate Indian treaty rights when admitting Wyoming to the Union. 112 The
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1694, 1700 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 1694.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1695 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 1696 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1698.
112. Id. (“There must be ‘clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict
between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose
to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.’” (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202–03 (1999) (quoting in turn United States v. Dion, 476
U.S. 734, 740 (1986))).
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Court then addressed the alternative grounds for the holding in Race Horse,
namely, whether the treaty rights were never meant to be perpetual, but
rather “temporary and precarious.”113 The Court found no such evidence
that the treaty rights at issue were meant to expire at statehood, again
applying the congressional intent test set forth in Mille Lacs.114 “Indian
treaties,” the Court stated, “‘must be interpreted in light of the parties’
intentions, with any ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians.’”115 The
State of Wyoming had also argued that even under the Mille Lacs decision
it should prevail because statehood, as a practical matter, “marked the
arrival of ‘civilization’ in the Wyoming Territory and thus rendered all the
lands in the State occupied.”116 The Court rejected this alternative
argument, however, reasoning that “statehood as a proxy for occupation”
goes against the Court’s clear instruction that “treaty-protected rights ‘are
not impliedly terminated upon statehood.’”117
On the second point, the majority in Herrera held that the establishment
of Bighorn National Forest did not categorically “occupy” the land within
the meaning of the 1868 Treaty.118 The majority relied on case law stating
that treaty terms should be construed “as they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.”119 Thus, the Indians’ understanding of the word
“unoccupied” would “denote an area free of residence or settlement by nonIndians.”120 Justice Sotomayor broke down the treaty and referred to the
word choice and syntax of various other articles of the 1868 Treaty to
bolster her conclusion. Citing articles 2 and 4, the opinion notes that the
word “occupation” was used by the drafters to also refer to the Tribe’s
occupation within the reservation—supporting the argument that
occupation and residence are synonymous. 121 Additionally, the treaty refers
to the Tribe members as “‘settlers’ on the new reservation.” 122
Commissioner Taylor, a key player in the treaty negotiations, even
113. See Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 515 (1896).
114. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1699.
115. Id. (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 206).
116. Id. at 1699–1700 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 48, Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S.
Ct. 1686 (2019) (No. 17-532)).
117. Id. at 1700 (quoting Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207).
118. Id. at 1700–01.
119. Id. at 1701 (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1701–02 (citing Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow Indians, supra note 34,
arts. 2, 4).
122. Id. at 1701.
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commented that “white people [were] rapidly increasing and . . . occupying
all the valuable lands.”123
After citing such compelling parallels, among other things, the majority
concluded it was “clear that President Cleveland’s proclamation creating
Bighorn National Forest did not ‘occupy’ that area within the treaty’s
meaning.”124 According to the majority, the President’s proclamation
language “made Bighorn National Forest more hospitable, not less, to the
Crow Tribe’s exercise of the 1868 Treaty right.”125 Overall, the majority
found Wyoming’s arguments unpersuasive; these included citing to mining
and logging activity on the land and federal regulation of the area as enough
to render the area “occupied.”126 Taking the stance that the treaty should be
understood as the Tribe understood it, the Court declared Bighorn National
Forest unoccupied when considering the Crow Tribe’s usufructuary rights
laid out in the 1868 Treaty.127
The majority rounded out its opinion with a few limitations. First was
that the entirety of the Bighorn forestland was not necessarily
“unoccupied,” and that Wyoming could prove on remand that the specific
place in which Herrera hunted was occupied. 128 At this stage, the State had
failed to carry that burden of proof. Second was that the argument
concerning the State’s ability to regulate the area was impeded by the
Tribe’s hunting right was not raised at the appellate level, and thus would
not be analyzed by the Supreme Court. 129 This point could be proven by the
State on remand as well.
D. Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion and the Dispute of Issue Preclusion
Justice Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined. 130 While the dissent
ultimately disagreed with the majority’s treaty interpretation methodology,
calling it “debatable,”131 the predominant disagreement concerned the
doctrine of issue preclusion. 132 The dissent contended that, based on the
123. Id. at 1702 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
124. Id. “The President ‘reserved’ the lands ‘from entry or settlement.’” (quoting
Presidential Proclamation No. 30, 29 Stat. 909).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1702–03.
127. Id. at 1703.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1703–13 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Tenth Circuit’s holding in Crow of Tribe Indians v. Repsis, Herrera was
precluded from bringing the action against the State, and the Repsis
decision controlled.133
Fundamentally, the majority and dissent disagreed about Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and its effect on the legal context
involved in these many similar cases. 134 The majority reasoned that the
legal context had changed based on the decision in Mille Lacs, and
therefore warranted invoking an exception to issue preclusion in Herrera. 135
While the dissent recognized the existence of the change-in-law exception,
Justice Alito warned that “caution is in order” when applying it, so as to
protect the doctrine of issue preclusion. 136 In other words, whether Ward v.
Race Horse was overturned in Mille Lacs was a question of degree.
This question of degree can be broken down into the two premises upon
which Race Horse relied: (1) the equal-footing doctrine, and (2)
congressional intent through statehood preemption. 137 Justice Alito writes
that while it may be clear that the Mille Lacs majority repudiated the equalfooting rationale of Race Horse, “it is by no means clear that Mille Lacs
also rejected the second ground.”138 Whether sufficient congressional intent
is present to relinquish treaty rights, Justice Alito contends, is a factspecific question that must be analyzed in the context of the specific
treaty.139
With this approach in mind, the dissent concluded that Race Horse had
not been sufficiently overruled in Mille Lacs, and therefore, the legal
context had not changed enough to warrant any exception to the doctrine of
issue preclusion.140 In other words, “there may not have actually been the
sea change in legal context to merit overriding the issue-preclusive effect of
Repsis.”141 Under this rationale, Herrera would be precluded from bringing

133. Id. at 1706 (Alito, J., dissenting).
134. Compare Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1694 (“[T]his case is controlled by Mille Lacs, not
Race Horse”), with Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1707–08 (Alito, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1707 (Alito, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1707–08 (Alito, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1708 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504
(1896).
138. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1708 (Alito, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. United States–Crow Treaty — Federal Indian Law — Indian Plenary Power
Doctrine — Herrera v. Wyoming, 133 HARV. L. REV. 402, 406 (2019) [hereinafter Indian
Plenary Power Doctrine].
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any challenge against the state since he is bound by the prior Tenth Circuit
judgment in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis.142
Taking it a step further, Justice Alito contended that, even if the changein-law exception applied to issue preclusion based on Mille Lacs’ apparent
reversal of Race Horse, Herrera was alternatively precluded by Repsis
based on the “unoccupied” portion of the Repsis opinion. 143 The dissent
disagreed with the majority’s choice to brush this conclusion aside, and
reasoned that this “independently sufficient ground” of the Repsis holding
acts with the same force as the primary holding referred to by the
majority. 144 This disagreement highlights the different Restatement of
Judgments approaches to issue preclusion when the case at issue contains
more than one holding. 145 The dissent favored the approach found in the
First Restatement of Judgments, which states that “a judgment based on
alternative grounds ‘is determinative on both grounds, although either alone
would have been sufficient to support the judgment.’”146 On the contrary,
the majority favored the Second Restatement’s approach, which states that
“a judgment based on the determination of two independent issues ‘is not
conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone.’”147
Put simply, the dissent believed that, in this instance, “each conclusion
provide[d] an independent basis for preclusion,”148 while the majority
believed that a change in the legal context of either would warrant applying
the exception to issue preclusion.149 An in-depth look at the details of the
dissent highlight the significance of Justice Gorsuch’s vote, discussed in
Part IV of this Note. Part III, however, will briefly examine the merits of
counterarguments in favor of the state.
III. The Case for Statehood Preemption and Looking Towards the Future
As Jefferson Keel, President of the National Congress of American
Indians, reiterated, the Herrera decision “affirm[s] that treaty rights are the
supreme law of the land, and they continue in perpetuity unless expressly

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
1982)).
148.
149.

Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1709 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1710 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1942)).
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST.
Id. at 1711 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1697–98.
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repealed by an act of Congress.”150 This tribal-friendly approach echoes the
original canons of construction found in landmark cases like Worcester v.
Georgia and the rest of the Marshall Trilogy.151 These cases read much like
Herrera: requiring clear congressional intent to extinguish treaty rights with
high deference to the tribes. As discussed in Part I, supra, the early case of
Ward v. Race Horse played a seminal role in establishing more statefriendly approaches to treaty interpretation that would be followed for more
than a century. 152 This shift away from tribal deference to state deference
heavily impacted tribal rights over the years, until cases like Mille Lacs and
Cougar Den were decided.
“Plenary power” approaches like statehood preemption are not without
their own merits. While these approaches see tribal authority as more
“conditional” and “premised on the more absolute sovereignty of the United
States,”153 they also take into account the ability of state governments to
regulate themselves unburdened by treaties made by the federal
government. This is especially true when usufructuary rights are at issue. 154
The question inevitably becomes whether the idea of statehood preemption
actually stands in contrast to the original canons of construction laid out by
the Marshall Court. For example, the Race Horse Court, after examining a
treaty identical to the one in Herrera, found the language “temporary and
precarious” in nature; 155 thus, the Court deemed the treaty right expendable
as originally understood by the drafters. The canons of construction laid out
in the Marshall Trilogy are employed by “giv[ing] the benefit of doubt to
Indians.”156 While initially it may seem likely that a court like the Race
Horse Court would fail to defer to the tribes, as the dissent in Herrera

150. NCAI Applauds the U.S. Supreme Court’s Opinion Issued in Herrera v.
Wyoming, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS (May 20, 2019), http://www.ncai.org/news/
articles/2019/05/20/ncai-applauds-the-u-s-supreme-court-s-opinion-issued-in-herrera-vwyoming.
151. These cases include Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1 (1831).
152. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
153. Indian Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 141, at 406.
154. See, e.g., Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686.
155. Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 514–16.
156. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of
States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267
(2001).
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contended, the balance may simply have fallen the other way based on the
originalist interpretation of the treaty in question. 157
In the words of the late former Justice Antonin Scalia, the plenary power
approaches are characterized as determining “what the current state of
affairs ought to be.”158 This was the mindset long espoused by the
Rehnquist Court in the 1980s and 1990s. 159 Dubbed the “subjectivist
approach” by some, 160 it has been heavily criticized and seems to have been
abandoned by a majority of the Court today, as seen in Herrera. But just
how far Herrera reaches is unclear; this Note will now examine its
implications.
IV. The Boundaries of the Herrera Decision, or the Lack Thereof
As noted previously,161 prior to Herrera, in Washington State Dept. of
Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., Justice Gorsuch sided with the liberal wing
of the Court and decided in favor of the Yakama Tribe after analyzing the
original interpretation of the clause in question. 162 In Herrera, Gorsuch
again departed from the conservative wing of the Court and became the
decisive fifth vote in favor of the Crow Tribe. 163 When comparing a case
like Herrera to a case like Repsis, it becomes clear that either case could
have easily gone the opposite way. Notably, when analyzing the reasoning
of both the majority and dissent in Herrera, it appears the majority had to
fight tooth and nail to reach a conclusion in favor of the Crow Tribe. This is
because, under issue preclusion, “a fundamental precept of common-law
adjudication is that an issue once determined by a competent court is
conclusive.”164 The majority applied a legitimate exception to the doctrine
in order to give Herrera his day in court, but, as the dissent noted, the
reasoning was somewhat attenuated since the Mille Lacs decision did not
157. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1703 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s
interpretation of the treaty “debatable”).
158. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996) (quoting
Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Apr. 4, 1990))
(emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
160. See Getches, supra note 156, at 268.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77.
162. See Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
163. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. 1686.
164. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983).
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explicitly overturn Race Horse.165 Moreover, the Repsis decision was based
on alternative holdings, one of which was not reliant on the Race Horse
decision.166
A key drawback of the Herrera decision is that the dissent mostly
discussed issue preclusion without reaching the interpretation question
explicitly. Justice Alito did refer to the majority’s interpretation as
“debatable,” but not necessarily erroneous.167 In the coming years, the
Court will likely deal with more disputes like those in Herrera, and we will
hopefully see where each justice stands on actual treaty interpretation rather
than legal obstacles like issue preclusion. What is important to take away
from Herrera, however, is how far the majority was willing to go to find for
the Crow Tribe rather than the State of Wyoming.
The Herrera decision ultimately foreshadows a “hopeful shift back
toward the foundational principles of Federal Indian law that have suffered
under the plenary power doctrine.”168 Following the departure of numerous
justices after the Mille Lacs decision and prior to cases like Cougar Den,
the Court’s stance in the Roberts era was shrouded in mystery in the context
of treaty interpretation. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Cougar Den
displayed his approach to treaty interpretation generally. His vote with the
majority in Herrera displayed his deference to the tribes. The question
becomes, however, whether such deference reaches further than hunting
rights on unoccupied land, or if it remains limited.
Because the Herrera decision was not an easy one for the Court, it seems
tribal deference is strong on the current Supreme Court after remaining a
mystery in recent years. Justice Gorsuch may have originally been thought
to side with the conservative bloc of justices on many issues, but tribal
issues seem to be one with which he diverges. As a newer justice on the
current Court, it will take more time to reveal his full stance on tribal issues.
Neither in Cougar Den, nor in Herrera did the majority use any language
that would limit its analysis to usufructuary rights cases. Put simply, the
majority in both cases approached treaty interpretation with an originalist
lens, giving the tribes the benefit of the doubt whenever possible.
According to Justice Gorsuch, the goal is to interpret the language in a way
“most consistent with the treaty’s original meaning.”169
165. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1707–08 (Alito, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1709 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1703 (Alito, J., dissenting).
168. Indian Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 141, at 406.
169. Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

422

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

V. Conclusion
In short, tribal treaty rights—not simply usufructuary ones—are
currently the safest they have ever been. Recent developments in case law
and turnover on the Supreme Court have all but solidified a strong majority
favoring tribal deference in treaty disputes. While the shift away from
plenary power approaches began with cases like Mille Lacs, it was not until
Herrera v. Wyoming that Americans got a glance into what seems like a
bright future for Native American tribes. The path to its ultimate conclusion
in favor of the Crow Tribe demonstrates the majority’s apparent goal in
treaty disputes: to analyze treaties with an originalist lens, ascertain the
intent of both parties, and extinguish tribal treaty rights only when the
congressional intent to do so is clear and unambiguous.
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